What is the problem of other minds Russell?
The problem of other minds says that we do not know whether others have conscious thoughts; Russell thinks we do know this because 1) our own intelligent behaviors are similar to the intelligent behaviors of others and that therefore, 2) we can generalize from our own case to the case of others.
What is avramides response to the problem of other minds?
Avramides rejects the claim that the problem of other minds is fundamentally epistemological. Instead, it is at core a conceptual issue. Drawing support from Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Davidson, she argues that once we have given a satisfactory account of the mind, the epistemological issue becomes unproblematic.
Is it rational to believe other minds?
Since belief in other minds is clearly rational, Plantinga argues, so is belief in God.
What is skepticism about other minds?
Scepticism about others’ minds is the claim that we have no knowledge of other people’s mental lives. This can sometimes strike us as a manifest truth. Such knowledge is unattainable, she concludes. Yet such scepticism should also strike us as strange and revisionary.
What is Russell’s argument from analogy for the mental states of other minds?
Russell believes that there are other minds because he can see actions in others that are analogous to his own without thinking about them. He believes that all actions are caused by thoughts, but what happens when we have a reaction resulting as an action of something forced upon one’s self?
Why is philosophy of mind important?
The main aim of philosophers working in this area is to determine the nature of the mind and mental states/processes, and how—or even if—minds are affected by and can affect the body.
Is dualism a theory?
In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical – or mind and body or mind and brain – are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing.
Can we have knowledge of other minds?
Therefore, according to Dretske, we can have direct perceptual knowledge of another’s mental states in the following sense: we can see that others are in pain, angry and the like, even though we cannot see another’s mental states or know that solipsism is false.
What is the thesis of the argument from analogy for other minds?
Is there a problem of other minds Gomes summary?
The traditional problem of other minds is an epistemological problem about knowledge. If knowing that another person has certain mental features entails the knowledge that one is not in a sceptical situation, cases of pretence and deception pose a prima facie obstacle to knowing about another’s mental life.
What is Nagel’s argument for skepticism about other minds?
So, as Nagel says, a skeptic of this sort is someone who thinks that we can’t know about “the existence of the floor under your feet, or the tree outside the window, or your own teeth.” All we can know, on this sort of view, are facts about the way things seem or appear to us — facts about our own sensations and other …
What is Bertrand Russell’s argument from analogy in response to that problem?
Russell’s argument: We need to consider the causal laws of observable behaviours. Human behaviour is a complex response to stimulus. If someone else reacts similar in similar circumstances, than I can assume by analogy that he is in similar mental states.